Now and again something interesting comes one’s way in the most unexpected of places.  The Conservative Woman ran a distinctly uninteresting piece yesterday titled “Conspiracy theorists can’t see that the West is already at war”.  It did not add a great deal to the sum of my knowledge.  But in the thread to it there was one 700-word comment on the 125,000 strong mafia group which is the Islamic Revolutionary Giuards Corps posted by someone going under the handle of “True Conservative”.  This guy (or girl) evidently reads some worthwhile sources, and took the following text wholesale from one of them.  I haven’t tried to check who, but the spelling suggests American.  Anyway, this is how it goes:

One of the least understood realities of modern Iran is that the country is no longer governed only by clerics. Over the last 30–35 years, power has gradually shifted toward a military-economic complex centered around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Many analysts now argue that Iran functions partly as a “military-commercial state.”

1. The IRGC Built a Parallel Economic Empire

After the Iran–Iraq War, Iran needed to rebuild infrastructure. The IRGC was given reconstruction contracts and gradually turned those projects into a massive business network.

The centerpiece is a giant conglomerate:

• Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters

It has become:

• Iran’s largest engineering contractor
• responsible for thousands of national projects
• active in oil, gas, dams, highways, railways, pipelines and mining

Some estimates suggest the company alone employs over 100,000 workers and thousands of subcontractors.

2. The Guards Now Control Huge Sections of the Economy

Over time, the IRGC expanded into almost every strategic sector:

• oil and gas
• petrochemicals
• construction
• telecommunications
• banking
• mining
• shipping and logistics
• media and electronics

Analysts estimate the IRGC’s networks may influence 10–50% of Iran’s economy depending on how indirect holdings are counted. That level of control is extraordinary. It means the IRGC is not just a military force — it is a corporate conglomerate embedded inside the state.

3. The Sanctions Paradox: Sanctions Strengthened the IRGC

One of the most surprising dynamics is this:

Western sanctions often strengthened the IRGC economically. Why? Because sanctions:

• pushed foreign companies out of Iran
• forced the government to rely on domestic contractors
• allowed IRGC firms to win huge no-bid state contracts

The Guards effectively became the default contractor for the entire national economy.

4. Privatization Made the Guards Even Richer

In the 2000s Iran began selling state assets. But many of those companies were purchased by entities linked to the IRGC. Example:

• The Telecommunication Company of Iran was sold in a controversial deal to an IRGC-linked consortium.

Parliamentary audits later suggested most privatized assets ended up with state-linked institutions, including IRGC affiliates. So what looked like privatization often became military consolidation of the economy.

5. The IRGC Also Controls the Sanctions-Evasion Economy

Because Iran faces heavy sanctions, a large part of the economy operates through informal networks. The IRGC reportedly runs:

• oil smuggling networks
• offshore shipping systems
• covert financial channels

In recent years the Guards were estimated to control 40–50% of Iran’s oil exports through unofficial networks. These revenues help fund:

• regional proxy groups
• missile development
• military operations abroad.

6. The “Military–Bonyad Complex”

Another layer of power comes from Iran’s religious foundations, known as bonyads. These foundations:

• control major industries
• pay no taxes
• answer directly to the Supreme Leader

Collectively they control around 20% of Iran’s GDP. Many operate closely with IRGC companies. The result is something analysts call the “military-bonyad complex.”

7. The Real Political Consequence

This structure changes how power works in Iran.Instead of a simple clerical theocracy, Iran now looks more like: clerical authority + military oligarchy + state-linked corporate networks.

In practice:

• clerics provide ideological legitimacy
• the IRGC provides force and money

The Guards control:

• the missile program
• large parts of the economy
• major internal security forces
• regional proxy networks.

That makes them arguably the most powerful institution in the country.

8. Why This Matters for Iran’s Future

This structure leads to a crucial insight: if the Iranian regime ever changes, it may not collapse like a normal government. Instead, the likely scenarios are:

1. IRGC-dominated state (military oligarchy)
2. internal coup within the regime
3. gradual reform negotiated with the Guards
4. fragmentation of the system

In other words. the real question is not “What do the clerics want?” It is “What does the IRGC want?”

One final fascinating point. Some Iran experts argue the IRGC today resembles the Chinese Communist Party’s PLA business empire in the 1990s or the Egyptian military economy under Sisi. But Iran’s system may be even more integrated, because the military, ideology, and economy are all fused together.

I think this is a better reading than, for example, the one at the site of the Council on Foreign Relations. In any case, the obvious questions which now flow are:

a) What did the Trump administration expect to achieve by its decapitation project, and what has it actually achieved?

b) If the administration’s foreign adventurism is, as it seems, entirely driven by gaining control of China’s oil supply, does it want to stay the course and resolve the problem of the IRGC or will it cut and run, lose its strategic gambit, and give the win to these characters and to Beijing?  Would seeing American failure in Iran only embolden Beijing to move on Taiwan?

c) If the Trump administration decides it has to stay the course in Iran what can it do now to bring down or at least gain control over the IRGC?