Where the great appetite for Russian empire began.

It is now clear that Vladimir Putin has been forced by the British, German, French and Polish leaders’ combined visit to Kiev, and their drive for a 30-day ceasefire, to cobble together a response, which came at 2.00 am this morning.  Putin avoided all mention of a ceasefire.  In fact, his proposal of picking up the talks in Istanbul that took place during the months immediately following the invasion also avoids the all-too-solid reason that Kiev shut them down, namely that the Russian Army’s Kiev offensive had been defeated.  The Russians retreated on 7th April 2022.  The gravest threat was past.  Istanbul was rendered unnecessary, even unhelpful; and Kiev duly withdrew in May.

The subsequent Russian retreats from Kharkiv, Kherson, and Sumi reduced the area under occupation by the Russian Army from 25% to 18% today.  The situation is completely different from Spring 2022 - but apparently not for Putin.  He wants to return to Istanbul next Thursday, 15th May for direct talks about what he perceives as “the root causes” of his invasion.  He said:

The point of such talks is to eliminate the root causes of the conflict and to establish a long-term, durable peace that will stand the test of time. We don’t rule out the possibility that, in the course of these negotiations, it might be possible to agree on new ceasefires — on a real truce

He is saying that the war must continue while, diplomatically, the Ukrainian democratic will to independence and autonomy is suppressed and the Russian will to empire is affirmed.  Istanbul served this purpose before, and Putin wants to return to it now.  By way of a reminder, this is ISW’s summation of the Istanbul Communiqué:

The draft agreement was never completed, and published versions contain Russian demands and Ukrainian counterproposals. The conditions below reflect the Russian demands, which stipulated that:

• Russia be treated as a neutral security “guarantor state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, repeating the premise of the Minsk II Accords that did not treat Russia as a belligerent in the war.
• Ukraine be forbidden to invite partner forces to conduct military exercises in Ukrainian territory, airspace, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zone without the consent of China and Russia.
• China and Russia have a veto over the mechanism for responding to future armed conflict in Ukraine by making China and Russia Ukraine’s security guarantors and granting the United Nations Security Council the authority to take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” China and Russia are permanent members of the UNSC and can use their veto power to block responses to future Russian aggression under these conditions.
• Ukraine amend its constitution to make Russian an official state language in Ukraine on an equal footing with the Ukrainian language and change a number of its internal laws, including Ukraine’s decommunization laws.
• Ukraine lift all Ukrainian sanctions against Russia imposed since 2014 and withdraw criminal cases against Russia in the International Criminal Court for war crimes against Ukraine.
• Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Ukraine disarm almost completely and commit never to fielding a military capable of defending the country. The draft agreement specifically imposed the following caps on the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
[the ISW pdf then details the full scale of the neutering of the Ukrainian armed forces which Putin required - Ed.]

Emmanuel Macron has already said that, although a step in the right direction, Putin’s proposal is “not enough”.  Donald Tusk has said, “the world is waiting for a clear decision on an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.”  Zelensky, emboldened by his growing influence on Donald Trump, has stated that Ukraine expects the Russian Federation to confirm the ceasefire from 12th May.  The European and Ukrainian fix is in.  Putin is striving to persist with his line, but he has been losing traction internationally; and is surely fearful of pushing Trump further into Zelensky’s embrace.  It gets worse.  According to Jade McGlynn, even if there is a ceasefire it cannot lead to peace for structural reasons inside Russia:

even if Putin were to seek peace, it is far from clear that the Russian state, economy, or social fabric could withstand it.

Over the past two years, the Russian economy has become militarised and sanctioned into dependency on war. Military production now drives GDP. Defence-sector employment, direct budget subsidies, and sanctioned parallel markets all hinge on continued conflict. A halt in military spending would risk mass unemployment, inflationary collapse, and the exposure of long-suppressed structural vulnerabilities in banking, logistics, and industrial supply chains.

The Russian security apparatus, already expanded and emboldened, would have no credible peacetime role. Hundreds of thousands of demobilised soldiers—many traumatised, others radicalised—would return to a society that neither values nor accommodates them. Veterans are not treated as heroes by a society that has tried its hardest to ignore the horror of a war conducted in their name and with their acquiescence. For many Russian soldiers, continued war would offer more meaning, stability, and income than any peacetime future.

Put simply, Russia is not ready for peace—economically, politically, or psychologically. Any ceasefire would be used not to end the war, but to reconstitute the means to continue it.

If Dr McGlynn is right, Trump will eventually be forced to institute secondary sanctions against customers for Russian oil and gas.  Down the line from there is not just Russian military and economic failure but the collapse of the Russian Federation itself, and a messy and dangerous series of internal political and ethnic struggles.  But perhaps that is what it would take to cleanse Muscovy of its centuries-old addiction to empire.