Announcing majorityrights wiki

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 01:03 AM | #

I suspected this project would be divisive and controversial.

Posted by ohp on June 17, 2007, 01:23 AM | #

“I suspected this project would be divisive and controversial. ”

The “divisiveness” and “controversy” in this thread have nothing to do with the wiki, per se, and little to do with “the Holocaust”. One hopes the wiki itself does not become a vehicle for German self-pity or anti-Anglo-Saxon browbeating.

Posted by Lurker on June 17, 2007, 02:55 AM | #

I read somewhere recently someone describing Wikipedia (and the problems of contributing/updating) as a dictatorship of idiots. Lets not have that here.

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 03:10 AM | #

The wiki itself, no. Everyone thinks it is a great idea. As for the wiki entries, that remains to be seen. I await the Second World War entry. Whose view of that conflict will come out on top?

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 03:19 AM | #

Perhaps Scimitar can write an entry concerning communitarianism. He is quite knowledgable of this political philosophy and himself a proponent of it. I would be very interested in it, though I could probably do it myself too but just not as good.

Alex Zeka and myself are having an exchange about that here.

Posted by J Richards on June 17, 2007, 03:40 AM | #

Wintermute,

Judicial index is an internet-wide discredited source?  Who has discredited it?  Zionists, no doubt.  This is not the best source because it does not meticulously cite its references and offers less than perfect grammar/spelling, but it is still a useful source.  I have not completely relied on it.  In calling the page sloppy, you ignore the majority of the contents, including the issue of lack of hard evidence of human remains, the persecution of revisionists, the timeline of the development of the Holocaust story, a million “Holocaust survivors” in 2004, camp residents in uniform, etc…facts that none of the “scholars” at the Nizkor Project could explain within their paradigm.  The Holocaust page is not final by a long shot and will be greatly expanded.  Most of your points are tangential to its contents.

Regarding the Irma Grese page at judicial index, I expect any reasonable person to ignore the stuff about her ghost and just consider the rest.

As far as the Red Cross figures go, I believe Zundel forced the Red Cross to produce them when he was being prosecuted in Canada.  If you find evidence that they are fake, then let me know.

As far as the reasonability of the Holocaust page goes, Friedrich Braun easily knows 10 times what I do about Nazi Germany, yet he hasn’t critiqued this page, indirectly showing that it appears to be broadly sound.

The use of torture at Nuremburg is important to establish, but more frequent were threats against wife and family.

Look up the link at Germar Rudolf’s site.  And, threatening family members is a form of [psychological] torture.

-------------------------

Holocaust Revisionist (for wintermute),

The 6 million figure predated the latter half of 1945...by years.  This is just one source.

--------------------------

Researcher,

An expert on Jewish economic behavior is certainly needed.  We need to add information on the Jewish domination of banking.  For instance, the Federal Reserve Banks, mislabeled to sound as if they are part of the U.S. government, are in reality Jewish-owned private banks and print U.S. bank notes and lend money, with interest, to the U.S. government.  Obviously, the U.S. government is never getting out of debt under this system.  The Jews in particular have also instituted fractional reserve banking, whereby banks are allowed to loan up to 10 times what they possess in assets.  In other words, these banks are generating money out of nothing and charging people the principal sum plus interest on it!  If you can summarize these issues at the wiki, it will be great and free me to work on other topics.  However, we can’t just allow unknown people to contribute to the wiki.  Please submit your writings on your area of expertise to Guessedworker, and we will go from there.

------------------------

Scimitar,

I suspected this project would be divisive and controversial.

The disputes will only be seen in the comments thread at the blog because anyone can comment here, which includes those who would like to sabotage our wiki project, but the wiki will be clean because we are going to control who gets to post there.

----------------------------

Lurker,

I don’t think there is going to be a dictatorship of idiots at MR wiki unless you consider Guessedworker, James Bowery and myself to be idiots.

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 03:50 AM | #

“the Germans were fighting to protect Europe from Communist annihilation, while the Americans and British were fighting towards that very goal. So the mass murders and societal destruction faced by Eastern Europe in Stalin’s grip must also be added to the Allied butcher’s bill.”

WM,

While I agree with most of your analysis, you embellish the truth here. Germany invaded the Soviet Union to conquer territory from the Russians; fighting communism was merely an excuse. Hitler eliminated any doubt of that in the Table Talk. German actions during the occupation clearly show that the thrust of German policy in Eastern Europe was colonial in nature. Hence, the alienation of the Ukrainians who initially welcomed the Germans as liberators. Also, Tito came to power on his own in Yugoslavia, and it was Tito who established communism in Albania. In Yugoslavia, as in Czechoslovakia, anti-fascist communist partisans became popular during the war because of their resistance to the German occupation. It simply isn’t fair to lay all of blame for Eastern European communism at the feet of the Allies.

As for wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, it was a partnership of convenience; an alliance Hitler brought down upon his own head through Barbarossa and his declaration of war on the United States. What did you expect the Allies to do? Declare war on the Soviet Union to drive their armies out of Eastern Europe? There was no public support for that. The Soviets were going nowhere. The Allies merely recognized the status quo. It was not something they were exactly thrilled with. The U.S. and Britain would spend the next fifty yearsembroiled in a Cold War with the USSR. Even before that, the material aid provided by the Soviets to Nazi Germany, ostensibly a neutral, encouraged the U.S. to aid the Allied war effort, eroding America’s own neutrality.

There are many things about the Third Reich which we can admire. Hitler’s foreign policy is not amongst them.

Posted by Lurker on June 17, 2007, 12:03 PM | #

J Richards - no, its more that I was amused by the phrase ‘dictatorship of idiots’ and as I understand it you are not going to allow any passing Tom, Dick or Harry editing rights, so it should be fine.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 17, 2007, 02:38 PM | #

“Germany invaded the Soviet Union to conquer territory from the Russians; fighting communism was merely an excuse.”

Fighting communism was not “merely an excuse.” It was part and parcel of Hitler’s drive in the East. While Germans had a mission in the East (the eradication of Judeo-Bolshevism), they had no clue whatsoever about what to do with the occupied lands in the West. German occupation of Western countries was characterised by amateurishness and improvisation. The war in the West was not part of the plan. The only thing that prevented a long-lasting understanding between Germany and Russia was communism.

“As for wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, it was a partnership of convenience; an alliance Hitler brought down upon his own head through Barbarossa and his declaration of war on the United States.”

The alliance with Stalin predates both Barbarossa and the declaration of war on the United States. The Allies didn’t say a peep while Stalin was raping the Baltics and Finland and gobbling up half of Poland, whose freedom was the ostensible excuse for going to war against Germany.

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 03:16 PM | #

The alliance with Stalin predates both Barbarossa and the declaration of war on the United States. The Allies didn’t say a peep while Stalin was raping the Baltics and Finland and gobbling up half of Poland, whose freedom was the ostensible excuse for going to war against Germany.

1.) I’m not aware of the existence of any such alliance. Which treaty are you referring to? The Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Germany prior to 1941. The USSR materially aided the German war effort against the Allies right up until Barbarossa. Why are the Allies to be condemned for their alliance of convenience with the USSR, but not Hitler’s Germany?

2.) As for the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland, Stalin’s aggression against these states was enabled by the pact he signed with Hitler; a curious diplomatic move for an anti-communist ideologue, no? You’re also wrong about the Allies not “raising a peep” re: Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. If I recall correctly, economic sanctions were slapped on the USSR, and diplomatic relations between the USSR and U.K. were strained for years thereafter.

Fighting communism was not “merely an excuse.” It was part and parcel of Hitler’s drive in the East.

Sure. Hitler intended to wipe out communism. No doubt about that. Still, fighting communism was ancillary to his larger geopolitical objective. His intentions re: Eastern Europe were made utterly clear in the Table Talk. He wanted to establish a German colonial empire in Poland and Russia along the lines of the British Raj. This line of thinking can also be found in Mein Kampf and the Zweites Buch. His actual policies on the ground also remove any doubt about that.

While Germans had a mission in the East (the eradication of Judeo-Bolshevism), they had no clue whatsoever about what to do with the occupied lands in the West. German occupation of Western countries was characterised by amateurishness and improvisation. The war in the West was not part of the plan.

Granted, Hitler did not desire war with Britain and France, and his invasion of the Low Countries and Scandinavia was improvised, but the important point is that he was willing to go to war with the West over Poland. In this respect, I see no reason to condemn the Allies for their actions while making excuses for Hitler’s irresponsible international brinkmanship. If Hitler was truly motivated by concern for the welfare of the German minority in Poland, I might agree, but that was obviously not the case: his actions in occupied Poland show that what he really sought was a mere land grab.

The only thing that prevented a long-lasting understanding between Germany and Russia was communism.

This simply isn’t true. Hitler’s own words in Mein Kampf, the Zweites Buch, and the Table Talk show otherwise. The actions of the SS in occupied Ukraine also prove that fighting communism wasn’t the primary reason for Hitler’s attack on the USSR.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 17, 2007, 05:04 PM | #

1.) I’m not aware of the existence of any such alliance. Which treaty are you referring to? The Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Germany prior to 1941. The USSR materially aided the German war effort against the Allies right up until Barbarossa. Why are the Allies to be condemned for their alliance of convenience with the USSR, but not Hitler’s Germany?

There is no need to point to some official treaty. Let’s look instead at the facts o the ground. Britain offered Stalin the hand of friendship in a letter from Churchill sent on 1 July 1940. Roosevelt’s attitude to Stalin was more than friendly, and American technology was already flowing like a river into the Soviet Union.

2.) As for the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland, Stalin’s aggression against these states was enabled by the pact he signed with Hitler; a curious diplomatic move for an anti-communist ideologue, no? You’re also wrong about the Allies not “raising a peep” re: Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. If I recall correctly, economic sanctions were slapped on the USSR, and diplomatic relations between the USSR and U.K. were strained for years thereafter.

I have already addressed why the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. As to economic sanctions on the USSR and diplomatic relations being strained, the facts show that to be also false, the exact opposite happened.

Sure. Hitler intended to wipe out communism. No doubt about that. Still, fighting communism was ancillary to his larger geopolitical objective. His intentions re: Eastern Europe were made utterly clear in the Table Talk. He wanted to establish a German colonial empire in Poland and Russia along the lines of the British Raj. This line of thinking can also be found in Mein Kampf and the Zweites Buch. His actual policies on the ground also remove any doubt about that.

It’s not an either or situation. He wanted to expand East and destroy communism. You don’t understand Nazi mentality and its fear and loathing of communism.

Granted, Hitler did not desire war with Britain and France, and his invasion of the Low Countries and Scandinavia was improvised, but the important point is that he was willing to go to war with the West over Poland. In this respect, I see no reason to condemn the Allies for their actions while making excuses for Hitler’s irresponsible international brinkmanship. If Hitler was truly motivated by concern for the welfare of the German minority in Poland, I might agree, but that was obviously not the case: his actions in occupied Poland show that what he really sought was a mere land grab.

When countries X and Y go to war against counrty Z because of some treaty, it’s always because counrties X and Y *chose*, made a conscious decision, to go to war. The bottom line is that it was Britain & France who *chose* to declare war on Germany over the German city of Danzig. 

Yes, the abuse of the German minority in Poland played a significant role and Hitler’s decision to wage war against it. And yes, once we made all the incredible sacrifices that are always attached to a military conflict, we take everything...not just Danzig. No apologies here either.  Until 1938 Hitler hoped for an alliance with Poland against Bolshevik Russia and you won’t find any anti-polack rhetoric on the part of Germans prior to 1938. On the contrary, Hitler congratulated them on their swift and ruthless taking of Teschen from Czechs. Pat Buchanan calls, in one of his books, the Polish colonels in charge of Poland in the 1930s foolhardy, sabre-rattling thugs...they went out of their way to provoke Hitler by refusing Hitler’s generous offer of November 1938 and by promulgating all sorts of anti-German measures.

Posted by Scimitar on June 17, 2007, 08:05 PM | #

There is no need to point to some official treaty. Let’s look instead at the facts o the ground. Britain offered Stalin the hand of friendship in a letter from Churchill sent on 1 July 1940. Roosevelt’s attitude to Stalin was more than friendly, and American technology was already flowing like a river into the Soviet Union.

That’s what I thought. There was no such treaty between the U.S. and USSR prior to 1941. If there had been, I would certainly be aware of it. The U.S. government didn’t even recognize the Soviet Union until 1933 (the last Western country to do so). As for American technology flowing into the Soviet Union, that was a result of the actions of private corporations scrounging for business opportunities in Russia during the Great Depression. Insofar as the U.S. government had an interest in this, it was getting Americans back to work; which was the overriding priority during the 1930s. Even alcohol was legalized to kick start the U.S. economy.

Why are the Allies to be singled out for condemnation? The Germans had an even closer economic relationship with the USSR than the West. The Nazis themselves weren’t above trading with even the Zionists in Palestine. German-Soviet economic cooperation goes back to Weimar during the 1920s when the USSR was still a pariah. It was German technology that flooded into the USSR during this period, and once again after the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler’s blessing. Soviet raw materials powered the German onslaught on the West from 1939 to 1941. Churchill may have sent a letter to Stalin in 1940, but so what? What economic relationship did Britain have the USSR with Hitler in control of the Continent and German U-boat sinking British shipping all the way to North America?

I have already addressed why the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. As to economic sanctions on the USSR and diplomatic relations being strained, the facts show that to be also false, the exact opposite happened.

I will have to retrieve my source about this.

It’s not an either or situation. He wanted to expand East and destroy communism. You don’t understand Nazi mentality and its fear and loathing of communism.

Expansion to the East was the overriding priority. It was more important to Hitler than peace with the West, the support of Russian and Ukrainian anti-communists, or even the German minorities in South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine. It was his determination to build a German colonial empire in Eastern Europe that caused the war in the first place, along with the determination of the Allies to stop him.

When countries X and Y go to war against counrty Z because of some treaty, it’s always because counrties X and Y *chose*, made a conscious decision, to go to war. The bottom line is that it was Britain & France who *chose* to declare war on Germany over the German city of Danzig. 

I’m not saying that Britain and France don’t share the blame. Still, if Hitler had been willing to honor international agreements and wasn’t so bent on playing Risk with Europe’s destiny, war probably would not have broken out over Poland in 1939. Chamberlain wouldn’t have issued his guarantee of Poland if Hitler had not violated the Munich agreement. Thus, Hitler is also responsible for WW2. He challenged Chamberlain to a game of geopolitical chicken and lost.

Yes, the abuse of the German minority in Poland played a significant role and Hitler’s decision to wage war against it.

I’m sure it did. Still, the German minority in the South Tyrol was abused by the Italians, and Hitler didn’t go to war with Italy over it. In fact, he wanted to resettle them in the lands he had conquered from Poland and Russia.

And yes, once we made all the incredible sacrifices that are always attached to a military conflict, we take everything...not just Danzig. No apologies here either.

The actions of the Third Reich don’t seems so noble when you realize Hitler was motivated by base territorial greed. It’s not like Germany had the birth rate for such a grand colonization scheme either.

Until 1938 Hitler hoped for an alliance with Poland against Bolshevik Russia and you won’t find any anti-polack rhetoric on the part of Germans prior to 1938. On the contrary, Hitler congratulated them on their swift and ruthless taking of Teschen from Czechs. Pat Buchanan calls, in one of his books, the Polish colonels in charge of Poland in the 1930s foolhardy, sabre-rattling thugs...they went out of their way to provoke Hitler by refusing Hitler’s generous offer of November 1938 and by promulgating all sorts of anti-German measures.

Granted, Hitler originally wanted major territorial concessions from the Poles and the reduction of Poland to a satellite like Slovakia or Croatia. The Poles also refused to negotiate in good faith; having been encouraged by the Brits and Americans to turn down Hitler’s offer. Afterwards, as you say, he changed his mind. Poland was to be colonized by German settlers.

But what if Hitler hadn’t been so willing to go to war over Poland in 1939? What if he wasn’t so motivated by the lust of a conquerer? History may have taken a different course. Why couldn’t the Third Reich have survived like Franco’s Spain? I approve of Hitler’s actions re: the Jews, Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, Lithuania, and even Danzig. It seems to me though that if Hitler had set out merely to reannex German minorities to the Third Reich that he could have got what he wanted eventually, and peacefully.

Posted by Matra on June 18, 2007, 05:44 PM | #

So why did Hitler - if it was true he didn’t want war with Britain - think Britain would just abandon its balance of power policy which it had consistently pursued for two and a half centuries. (Actually there are examples of England having this policy in the 1500s).

In the years after Versailles the British were generally sympathetic to Germany’s plight. Bringing Germany back into the international system was a major goal of British diplomacy. Most of what Hitler asked for was acceptable to Britain. Chamberlain wrote in a 1937 memorandum that he believed Hitler didn’t want war and that his goals could be achieved within the international sytem with Germany eventually returning to the League. Britain was willing to change Versailles as it believed German grievances about the settlement were understandable. But it wanted to do this through mutual agreement as opposed to allowing Germany to just tear it up. It signed a naval agreement with Germany and had few problems with limited German rearmament. Allowing Germany to dominate Eastern Europe, however, was never acceptable to Britain. That should have been obvious to Hitler. Perhaps he believed Ribbentrop who was telling France and Britain were willing to accept any solution that avoided war. Had Hitler studied British and English foreign policy history he’d have known he was pushing too far. Maybe he did but just didn’t care.

Hitler: It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the east...

Posted by Scimitar on June 18, 2007, 06:58 PM | #

So why did Hitler - if it was true he didn’t want war with Britain - think Britain would just abandon its balance of power policy which it had consistently pursued for two and a half centuries. (Actually there are examples of England having this policy in the 1500s).

Probably because the British had backed down over the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, Abyssinia, Spain, and Manchuria. He believed Chamberlain was bluffing with his guarantee of Poland. Hitler’s major mistake was his assumption that British foreign policy was still motivated by balance of power concerns. Thus, he assumed he could reach an accomodation with Britain over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, as no clear British interests were at stake there; certainly none that warranted risking a world war over traditionally German territory.

What Hitler sought was German self sufficiency through the establishment of German hegemony over Mitteleuropa. He had no interest in challenging British supremacy at sea or colonial rule abroad. For those reasons, he could not understand why the British government perceived the new Germany to be such a threat. Certainly, the major threats to British interests were the United States and the Soviet Union; the former was challenging British economic interests abroad and Russia was the traditional threat to Britain in Asia. Japan in the Pacific, also. An alliance with Germany, Hitler reasoned, would mutually benefit Germany and Britain alike.

Posted by Scimitar on June 18, 2007, 07:40 PM | #

In the years after Versailles the British were generally sympathetic to Germany’s plight. Bringing Germany back into the international system was a major goal of British diplomacy. Most of what Hitler asked for was acceptable to Britain. Chamberlain wrote in a 1937 memorandum that he believed Hitler didn’t want war and that his goals could be achieved within the international sytem with Germany eventually returning to the League. Britain was willing to change Versailles as it believed German grievances about the settlement were understandable. But it wanted to do this through mutual agreement as opposed to allowing Germany to just tear it up. It signed a naval agreement with Germany and had few problems with limited German rearmament.

There is some truth to this. Prior to 1938, the British press was broadly sympathetic to revising the Versailles. Still, we should not exaggerate. It was Britain and France that forced Versailles on Germany in the first place. Much of the British leniency towards Germany in the 1920s was motivated less by sympathy for the German plight than it was by pressure from the United States which held British war debts (the U.S. was the major supporter of rehabilitating Germany during the 1920s). The U.S. never accepted Versailles and signed an independent peace with the Germans. Wilson himself admitted that the punative territorial conditions placed on Germany by Britain and France were likely to cause another war (he hoped this could be corrected through the League of Nations).

What this really all boils down to is that the British and French really liked the international system that emerged from the First World War and their privileged place within it. They were willing to support ending Germany’s status as an international pariah, but only so long as the Germans were willing to play by their rules and accept their gains in the previous war. Germany was not to be treated as an equal amongst the great powers. Thus, Germany had to tolerate the existence of Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and other artificial states created for the sole purpose of advancing French interests in Central Europe. Hitler was determined to end this state of affairs and secure German economic independence through eastward expansion. The British and French couldn’t tolerate that and went to war over Poland.

Allowing Germany to dominate Eastern Europe, however, was never acceptable to Britain. That should have been obvious to Hitler.

Yet Britain could dominate Australia, India, the Middle East, Canada, and much of Africa and East Asia; to say nothing of international trade through its naval dominance. Obviously, the British had a stake in preserving the status quo. Even better, a weakened Germany eviscerated by treaties and surrounded by French satellites like Poland and Czechoslovakia. From Hitler’s perspective, what had to be the most galling about this is how the British dressed up their ill gotten gains in the clothes of morality, specifically, their bizarre insistence that the international status quo was somehow sacred and war was a criminal act.

Perhaps he believed Ribbentrop who was telling France and Britain were willing to accept any solution that avoided war. Had Hitler studied British and English foreign policy history he’d have known he was pushing too far. Maybe he did but just didn’t care.

Going to war over Danzig and the Polish Corridor was insane, even by British standards. Then again, this sort of stupidity had characterized British foreign policy for at least ten years. The British had already alienated Mussolini over worthless Abyssinia a few years earlier. Chamberlain had also went out of his to alienate FDR during the late 1930s.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 18, 2007, 11:27 PM | #

”Why are the Allies to be singled out for condemnation?”

I’m not the one claiming that W.W.II was a humanitarian war for “freedom & democracy”, a Cosmic Battle between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness; instead of old European power politics.

“Expansion to the East was the overriding priority. It was more important to Hitler than peace with the West, the support of Russian and Ukrainian anti-communists, or even the German minorities in South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine. It was his determination to build a German colonial empire in Eastern Europe that caused the war in the first place, along with the determination of the Allies to stop him.
When countries X and Y go to war against counrty Z because of some treaty, it’s always because counrties X and Y *chose*, made a conscious decision, to go to war. The bottom line is that it was Britain & France who *chose* to declare war on Germany over the German city of Danzig.
I’m not saying that Britain and France don’t share the blame. Still, if Hitler had been willing to honor international agreements and wasn’t so bent on playing Risk with Europe’s destiny, war probably would not have broken out over Poland in 1939. Chamberlain wouldn’t have issued his guarantee of Poland if Hitler had not violated the Munich agreement. Thus, Hitler is also responsible for WW2. He challenged Chamberlain to a game of geopolitical chicken and lost.

What “international agreements” didn’t Hitler honour? As to Munich, I presume that you’re referring to the Czechoslovak crisis. No matter what Hitler had done in that situation he would’ve been condemned by the Munich Powers.  Had he decided to throw German weight behind the Czechs in an effort to maintain Czech rule over the Slovaks, he would have been denounced for converting the Czech state into a German puppet regime. In the alternative, his decision to support the Slovaks was denounced as a sinister plot to disrupt the Czechoslovak state which the Munich Powers had failed to protect with their guarantee.

“I’m sure it did. Still, the German minority in the South Tyrol was abused by the Italians, and Hitler didn’t go to war with Italy over it. In fact, he wanted to resettle them in the lands he had conquered from Poland and Russia.”

I’ll be the first to say that Hitler’s gift of South Tyrol to the Italians bordered on state treason. (However, Italian abuses paled in comparison to Poles’ awe-inspiring bestiality. It’s the sad task of Germans to periodically have to give polacks a kick in the balls, just so they don’t get any funny ideas. It’s good for them, it keeps them in line.)

“The actions of the Third Reich don’t seems so noble when you realize Hitler was motivated by base territorial greed. It’s not like Germany had the birth rate for such a grand colonization scheme either.”

“base”; “greed”...you’re making a value judgement. Russians gained their huge landmass through the force of arms. The United States’ “Manifest Destiny” was a gargantuan land grab at the expense of Indian tribes and Mexicans disguised as something ordained from Heaven. More virile and energetic races have always attempted to expand territorially and increase their resources. I don’t see why National Socialists should be singled out for moralistic opprobrium. However, it was Stalin’s designs on Germany that forced Hitler’s hand and he pre-emptively attacked the Soviet Union only a few weeks before the Soviet invasion. I urge you to pick up Victor Suvorov’s Icebreaker; he marshals impressive evidence to support his thesis; only the fear of communism kept Germany from reaching a long-lasting agreement with Russia.

Posted by Svyatoslav Igorevich on June 19, 2007, 01:01 AM | #

I read somewhere recently someone describing Wikipedia (and the problems of contributing/updating) as a dictatorship of idiots. Lets not have that here.

The central cause of the uselessness of Wikipedia on most controversial issues seems to be N.P.O.V.; i.e., the pretension to Encylopedia-hood.  Multiple articles from the various P.O.V.s seems a better way.  Otherwise you get fact-by-consensus, an idiotic, anti-western process.

Posted by Scimitar on June 19, 2007, 01:27 AM | #

I’m not the one claiming that W.W.II was a humanitarian war for “freedom & democracy”, a Cosmic Battle between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness; instead of old European power politics.

I don’t embrace that view either.

What “international agreements” didn’t Hitler honour?

The Munich agreement, specifically. After he got his way in the Sudetenland, he engineered the destruction of Czechoslovakia and occupied Bohemia and Moravia. This completely undermined his position that he only sought to reunite continguous abused German minorities with the Third Reich. It caused Chamberlain to issue his guarantee of Poland which occasioned the war.

As to Munich, I presume that you’re referring to the Czechoslovak crisis. No matter what Hitler had done in that situation he would’ve been condemned by the Munich Powers.  Had he decided to throw German weight behind the Czechs in an effort to maintain Czech rule over the Slovaks, he would have been denounced for converting the Czech state into a German puppet regime. In the alternative, his decision to support the Slovaks was denounced as a sinister plot to disrupt the Czechoslovak state which the Munich Powers had failed to protect with their guarantee.

You’re embellishing the truth here. As Matra points out, a broad spectrum of British political opinion supported revising the Versailles treaty up until his repudiation of Munich. This was especially true of the British press. See Franklin Reid Gannon’s The British Press and Germany, 1936-39.  Re: the Slovak secessionists, Hitler wasn’t facing a damned if you do, damned if you don’t dilemma. It was Hitler who put them under enormous pressure to secede in the first place. He also bullied the Czechs into accepting the German occupation; threatening military retaliation if they refused. That destroyed his credibility in the U.K. and turned the British media against him, which forced the Chamberlain government to take a harder stance on Poland.

I’ll be the first to say that Hitler’s gift of South Tyrol to the Italians bordered on state treason. (However, Italian abuses paled in comparison to Poles’ awe-inspiring bestiality. It’s the sad task of Germans to periodically have to give polacks a kick in the balls, just so they don’t get any funny ideas. It’s good for them, it keeps them in line.)

Granted, the Poles did abuse the German minority, and Hitler had every right to be furious about that. Still, the point I was making is that the minority question always took a backseat in Hitler’s mind to his larger geopolitical goal of eastward expansion. And it wasn’t just the South Tyrol (which Hitler wrote an essay about in the Zweites Buch, arguing in favor of an alliance with Italy). Alsace-Lorraine in France, Eupen-Malmedy in Belgium, and North Schleswig in Denmark, too.

“base”; “greed”...you’re making a value judgement.

Yes, I am. In my view, some of Hitler’s actions were justified: repudiating the punative Versailles treaty, sterilization of the Rhineland bastards, ridding Germany of the Jews, annexing contiguous German minorities to the Reich, etc. I can agree with all of this. I can’t support his larger foreign policy objective of establishing a German empire in Eastern Europe, although I can understand his motivations for doing so; his desire to break free of the British dominated international system.

Russians gained their huge landmass through the force of arms. The United States’ “Manifest Destiny” was a gargantuan land grab at the expense of Indian tribes and Mexicans disguised as something ordained from Heaven. More virile and energetic races have always attempted to expand territorially and increase their resources.

Perhaps. A major difference should be kept in mind here though: Americans and Russians expanded into relatively unpopulated areas. Germany was in no position to do so for geographical reasons.

I don’t see why National Socialists should be singled out for moralistic opprobrium.

I’m not doing that here. As I said above, I think Britain and France also share a large part of the blame for the Second World War. FDR as well.

However, it was Stalin’s designs on Germany that forced Hitler’s hand and he pre-emptively attacked the Soviet Union only a few weeks before the Soviet invasion. I urge you to pick up Victor Suvorov’s Icebreaker; he marshals impressive evidence to support his thesis; only the fear of communism kept Germany from reaching a long-lasting agreement with Russia.

Hitler’s conversations in the Table Talk suggest otherwise.

Posted by Matra on June 19, 2007, 06:54 PM | #

Probably because the British had backed down over the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, Abyssinia, Spain, and Manchuria. He believed Chamberlain was bluffing with his guarantee of Poland.

Hitler was aware of British rearmament within days of Munich and commented on it a week or so into October 1938. Even in the days before Munich there were signs that Britain was willing to go to war. A few days before Chamberlain again scurried off to meet Hitler Foreign Secretary Halifax led a Cabinet revolt against Chamberlain after Hitler increased his demands to include the immediate control of the Sudetenland. This revolt was substantial involving nearly half the Cabinet. In England trenches were being dug and gas masks passed out before Chamberlain returned to Germany.

After Prague, March 1939, Britain’s approach to Germany changed. Although Chamberlain was still ready to use diplomacy as there were negotiations right up to the beginning of the war but Britain’s foreign policy definitely changed after Prague. Hitler recognised it too. In May 1939 he said:

Further successes can no longer be attained without the shedding of blood…
Danzig is not the object of our activities. It is a question of expanding our living-space in the east...There is no question of sparing Poland…
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair…
If it is not certain that German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the west, the fight must be primarily against England and France.

Hitler knew Britain was getting serious. He pressed on regardless. As Scimitar said, expanding to the east was more important to him than peace with Britain and France.

Hitler’s major mistake was his assumption that British foreign policy was still motivated by balance of power concerns. Thus, he assumed he could reach an accomodation with Britain over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, as no clear British interests were at stake there

Britain was still concerned about the balance of power. Britain wanted Germany brought into the international system and so was willing to accept changes to Versailles. Everything Germany asked for up until 1938 was acceptable to Britain. But Germany with its greater population than either Britain or France was now ready to become the dominant power in Europe through its eastward expansion.

Whether it was true or whether the old balance of power policy was wise in 1939 are separate matters. Britain thought the balance of power was about to be eradicated and acted accordingly...and predictably.

What this really all boils down to is that the British and French really liked the international system that emerged from the First World War and their privileged place within it. They were willing to support ending Germany’s status as an international pariah, but only so long as the Germans were willing to play by their rules and accept their gains in the previous war. Germany was not to be treated as an equal amongst the great powers. Thus, Germany had to tolerate the existence of Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and other artificial states created for the sole purpose of advancing French interests in Central Europe.

The countries to Germany’s east were, with the exception of Poland, small and relatively weak. They were no threat to Germany.

Besides Germany wasn’t the only country bitter after WW1. Eastern France was devastated as was the French population. The French thought the British were too willing to understand German concerns. Chamberlain came to office wanting to orchestrate a grand settlement of Europe’s problems but had to deal with two embittered states in France and Germany. Britain’s appeasement policy including abandoning collective security upset the French. But he was willing to do it if Germany could be assuaged. But Hitler had already shown himself to be an untrustworthy negotiating partner and now he was threatening to smash the international system. That was too much for not just Chamberlain but most of Europe.

Posted by Matra on June 19, 2007, 07:04 PM | #

The British had already alienated Mussolini over worthless Abyssinia a few years earlier

Britain was more concerned about the Italian threat to Egypt and Malta.

Posted by Rnl on June 19, 2007, 08:16 PM | #

Scimitar wrote:

Hitler’s conversations in the Table Talk suggest otherwise.

The Hitler-Bormann documents, if they are genuine, support Suvorov’s thesis. So for interest’s sake, here is the relevant passage:

===

26th February 1945

[...]

The attitude of the Russians during the summer of 1940, the fact that they had absorbed the Baltic States and Bessarabia while we ourselves were busy in the west left me with no illusions regarding their intentions. And even if I had retained any, Molotov’s visit in November would have been sufficient to dissipate them. The proposals which Stalin submitted to me after the return of his Minister did not deceive me. Stalin, that incomparable and imperturbable blackmailer, was trying to gain time in order to consolidate his advanced bases in Finland and the Balkans. He was trying to play cat and mouse with us.

The tragedy, from my point of view, was the fact that I could not attack before 15th May, and if I were to succeed in my first initial onslaught, it was essential that I should not attack later than that date. Stalin, however, could have launched his attack much earlier. Throughout the winter of 1940, and even more so in the spring of 1941, I was haunted by the obsession that the Russians might take the offensive. In the event, the Italian defeats in Albania and in Cyrenaica had roused a minor storm of revolt in the Balkans. Indirectly, they also struck a blow at the belief in our invincibility, that was held by friend and foe alike.

This alone was the cause of Yugoslavia’s volte face, an event that compelled us to drag the Balkans into the war; and that was something which at all costs I had desired to avoid. For once we had become involved in that direction we might well have been tempted to go still further ahead. I need hardly say that in the spring of I941 we could rapidly have liberated the Near East with only a small fraction of the forces which we were about to employ against Russia. But to have removed the necessary forces from their place in our order of battle at that juncture would have been to incur the indirect danger of giving Russia a signal to attack. They would have done so in the summer, or at the latest in the autumn, and under conditions so disastrous from our point of view, that we could never have hoped to win the day.

Where the Jew-ridden democracies are concerned, the Russians have the patience of an elephant. They know with absolute certainty that sooner or later and without recourse to war, they will succeed in establishing dominion over them, thanks to the internal dissensions that rend them, the succession of economic crises from which they seem unable to escape and the powerful lure of Marxism to which they are particularly vulnerable. But they also know that in the case of the Third Reich the situation is very different. They know that in every field of endeavour, and more so in peace than in war, we shall everywhere outclass them.

The explanation of this patience which the Russians exhibit is to be found in their philosophy, which allows them to avoid taking risks and to wait - a year, a generation, a century, if necessary - until the time is ripe for the implementation of their plans. Time means nothing to them. Marxism, certainly, has promised them a paradise on earth - but certainly not today, not even tomorrow, but some time in the dim, indefinite future.

Notwithstanding this patience which is the backbone of their power, the Russians could not stand idly aside and watch the destruction of Great Britain, for in that case, with the United States and Japan cancelling each other out, as it were, the Russians would find themselves face to face with us - and alone. And that would mean without any doubt that, at a time and a place of our choice, the long-outstanding issue between us would be settled in our favour.

If I felt compelled to decide to settle my accounts with Bolshevism by force of arms, and, indeed, arrived at my decision on the very anniversary of the signing of the Moscow pact; I have every right to believe that Stalin had come to the same decision before even he signed the pact.

For a whole year I adhered to the hope that an entente, at least honestly sincere if not unreservedly friendly, could be established between the Third Reich and Stalin’s Russia. I imagined that after fifteen years of power Stalin, the realist, would have rid himself of the nebulous Marxist ideology and that he was preserving it merely as a poison reserved exclusively for external use. The brutal manner in which he decapitated the Jewish intelligensia, who had rendered him such signal service in the destruction of Tsarist Russia, encouraged me in that belief. I presumed that he did not wish to give these same Jew intellectuals the chance of bringing about the downfall of the totalitarian empire which he had built - that Stalinist empire which, in all its essentials, is only the spiritual succesor to the empire of Peter the Great.

In a spirit of implacable realism on both sides we could have created a situation in which a durable entente would have been possible - by defining precisely the zones of influence to be attributed to each party, by rigorously restricting our collaboration to the field of economics and in such a manner that both parties would have derived benefits therefrom. An entente, in short, watched over by an eagle eye and with a finger on the trigger!

Posted by Scimitar on June 19, 2007, 08:40 PM | #

Britain was more concerned about the Italian threat to Egypt and Malta.

Which was alleviated by slapping economic sanctions on Italy, alienating Mussolini, destroying the Stresa Front, and turning a friend of Britain into Nazi Germany’s major ally in Europe, how? The U.S. was willing to sell Mussolini all the oil he wanted. If the British were truly pursuing a balance of power strategy, as you insist they were, they would have preserved their alliance with Fascist Italy by ceding to Mussolini the worthless territory of Abyssinia; an extremely small price to pay for the security of the Mediterranean, and the chance to avoid a third front in a potential world war.

And what about the Japanese? In East Asia, the British had condemned Japan for its occupation of Manchuria. The British antagonized the Japanese even further by failing to renew the Anglo-Japanese treaty and by placing an oil embargo on Japan along with the other ABCD powers. The actions of Britain viz Germany also clearly show that the preservation of the precious League of Nations took precedence for the British over their traditional balance of power strategy. Further evidence of this can be seen in Chamberlain’s attitude towards FDR throughout the late 1930s.

Britain was still concerned about the balance of power.

I disagree. Since the 1920s, British foreign policymakers had cared more about liberal internationalism than realism; hence, the willingness of Britain to go to war over a trivial reason like Danzig - a German city.

Britain wanted Germany brought into the international system and so was willing to accept changes to Versailles.

To a certain extent. The Stresa Front between Britain, France, and Italy was formed to resist changes to the Versailles status quo.

Everything Germany asked for up until 1938 was acceptable to Britain. But Germany with its greater population than either Britain or France was now ready to become the dominant power in Europe through its eastward expansion.

I wouldn’t put it that way. In the Rhineland and Austria, Hitler forced the issue, and the Allies backed down. In Czechoslovakia, he threatened to do so again, and the Allies backed down a third time. Britain and France didn’t prefer any of these changes, especially the latter.

Whether it was true or whether the old balance of power policy was wise in 1939 are separate matters. Britain thought the balance of power was about to be eradicated and acted accordingly...and predictably.

Britain wasn’t following the balance of power strategy, though. The balance of power in Europe would not have been adversely affected if Hitler had gotten Danzig and the Polish Corridor; which is what he was asking for, at least formally. A foreign policy realist would not have gone to war over the Polish Corridor. A liberal internationalist would have. A war against Germany was more likely to destroy Britain’s international standing than anything else.

Hitler knew Britain was getting serious. He pressed on regardless. As Scimitar said, expanding to the east was more important to him than peace with Britain and France.

Likewise, preserving the contemporary liberal international system, and their dominance within it, was more important to Britain and France than peace with Germany.

The countries to Germany’s east were, with the exception of Poland, small and relatively weak. They were no threat to Germany.

They were allied with Germany’s major enemy on the Continent - France. The Germans had every right to be embittered over a cordon sanitaire of French satellites along their eastern border. Britain would have ferociously resisted any German attempt to reduce Ireland to a satellite as well.

But he was willing to do it if Germany could be assuaged. But Hitler had already shown himself to be an untrustworthy negotiating partner and now he was threatening to smash the international system. That was too much for not just Chamberlain but most of Europe.

An international system dominated by Britain and France, skewed towards their interests, at the expense of other nations like Germany. Hitler was right about one thing - there was nothing sacred about the contemporary world order. It wasn’t just the Germans who were dissatisfied with that system either - the Hungarians, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Romanians, Spaniards, Balts, Croats, Russians, and Irish all had their own complaints.

After Prague, March 1939, Britain’s approach to Germany changed. Although Chamberlain was still ready to use diplomacy as there were negotiations right up to the beginning of the war but Britain’s foreign policy definitely changed after Prague. Hitler recognised it too.

This is not in dispute.

Hitler was aware of British rearmament within days of Munich and commented on it a week or so into October 1938. Even in the days before Munich there were signs that Britain was willing to go to war. A few days before Chamberlain again scurried off to meet Hitler Foreign Secretary Halifax led a Cabinet revolt against Chamberlain after Hitler increased his demands to include the immediate control of the Sudetenland. This revolt was substantial involving nearly half the Cabinet. In England trenches were being dug and gas masks passed out before Chamberlain returned to Germany.

In the end, Britain did not go to war over the violation of the Munich agreement. Hitler was also convinced the British would back down over Poland. Although he was ultimately proven wrong, he had valid reasons to believe this.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 20, 2007, 02:02 AM | #

“Hitler’s conversations in the Table Talk suggest otherwise.”

I have the Talk on my desk in front of me. What are you referring to?

I get annoyed at folks who dismiss Suvorov or, most recently, Pleshakov http://www.amazon.com/Stalins-Folly-Constantine-Pleshakov/dp/0297846264 without having read either. I know that that’s not you.

I kept reading emotional and hysterical and shrill reviews that Suvorov has been discredited, etc. [by whom?] that I started to smell a rat. Once I decided to read the book myself, I couldn’t find one under a $1000. Fortunately, I asked someone I know who teaches at a university in my city to take it out for me from his university’s library. His book presents solid evidence on every page and is footnoted like any scholarly work. Additionally, since he was an officer in Soviet intelligence he had access to their archives. But you can dismiss all the information from the archives and just go with what has been published in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. That’s enough. There’s little doubt in my mind that Stalin was preparing for an offensive war once Hitler and the Western Powers exhausted themselves in a war in Europe. What he didn’t expect is a pre-emptive campaign by Hitler.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 20, 2007, 02:08 AM | #

Any time an author get’s repeatedly called an “Nazi apologist” it’s a sure sign that he’s unto something important.

Posted by Scimitar on June 20, 2007, 03:59 AM | #

I have the Talk on my desk in front of me. What are you referring to?

The extensive discussions about his colonization plans. Presumably, you are familar with these. I see no reason to copy and paste them here.

I kept reading emotional and hysterical and shrill reviews that Suvorov has been discredited, etc. [by whom?] that I started to smell a rat.

I have never read Suvorov (his book is not easy to get your hands on). I have read 1.) Hitler’s Table Talk, 2.) the Goebbels Diaries, Norman Rich’s Hitler’s War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order, and Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia.

I kept reading emotional and hysterical and shrill reviews that Suvorov has been discredited, etc. [by whom?] that I started to smell a rat.

Gorodetsky, presumably. And yes, I know: Gorodetsky is a Jew.

Posted by Matra on June 20, 2007, 03:39 PM | #

Scimitar, Britain and France didn’t go to war over Danzig.

Germany was overturning the power balance in Europe. Initially the British thought the Germans could be brought into the system - and, yes, it was a system that suited the British. They thought it could also suit Hitler but were wrong. The British policy was flexible. The French wanted stronger guarantees of collective security (though not against Italy over Ethiopia) but Britain preferred to take each issue as it came up.

In mid-1939 both Britain and France were seeing results from their rearmament programmes and thought they were in better position to fight than they had been previously or would be in the future if Germany was dominating Eastern Europe. In late March the British Military Attache in Berlin suggested that Britain should push for war as soon as possible as Germany wasn’t ready to fight a major war. But given more time and access to Eastern European resources the Germans looked stronger in the long term. Chamberlain still hoped that the now stronger military capacity of Britain and France could deter Hitler but he did not believe time was on Britain’s side. Unless Hitler was willing to compromise a clash was inevitable. The Danzig crisis was the moment Britain and France chose to take their stand but it wasn’t the fate of Danzig they went to war over.

Britain pinned its hopes on maintaining the balance of power by using a flexible international system to create and manage a general settlement of outstanding issues. Britain and France were two proud colonial great powers living in fear of decline being treated like has-beens by Hitler. German domination of Europe with the subsequent decline of Britain and France was less acceptable to them than war. Hitler should’ve been aware of that.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 20, 2007, 09:53 PM | #

“The extensive discussions about his colonization plans. Presumably, you are familar with these. I see no reason to copy and paste them here.”

Nothing in the Table proves that Hitler didn’t launch a pre-emptive war. I have little doubt, however, that Hitler wouldn’t have invaded Russia anyway eventually, if Stalin didn’t invade Germany beforehand. There was no room in Europe for both Stalin and Hitler.

Posted by Friedrich Braun on June 20, 2007, 09:56 PM | #

Matra’s “Balance of Power” in Europe was obsolete following the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia.

Posted by J Richards on June 25, 2007, 11:14 AM | #

Svyatoslav Igorevich,

The central cause of the uselessness of Wikipedia on most controversial issues seems to be N.P.O.V…

Wikipedia does not have a neutral point of view with reference to controversial issues; this is its point of view.  Wikipedia merely makes a pretence to an N.P.O.V.